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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
GORDON R. ANDREASON

'

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
JOHN vV. TURNER, Warden
Utah State Prison

CASE NO.
12564

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a Habeas Corpus matter contesting detention
of the Plaintiff-Appellant in the Utah State Prison of
the crime of robbery.
DISPOSITION BY THE CASE BY
LOWER COURT
Judge Marcellus K. Snow, Third Judicial District,
held that the Appellant's restraint was not unlawful or
illegal and ordered that the same, be denied. (R-11). An
amended finding of facts and conclusion of law was filed
and duly signed by Lower Court with the same result.
(R-14).
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SOUGHT ON APPEAL
rrhe A p1Jellant seeks to reverse the .Judgment of the
Lower Court.
01!-, FAcrrs

The Appellant is currently s<>rving a sentence in th0
Utah State Prison for rohlwry.

'11 he sentence arose out

of judgment and co11vidi on from the Second .Judicial
District Court, 'Veher County, State of Utah, rendered
on .July 27, l!J68. rrlwse facts are undisputed. (R-6).
At the time of the hearing on thp Habeas Corpus the
trial transcript (State of Utah vs. Gordon R. Andreason,
No. 9087), was admitted into evidence as Plaintiff's exhibit #2. Inasmuch as the Appellant claims error which
occurred during the trial, n frrence will be made to the
1

trial transcript by the following designation: (Exh. 2
Tr ......... ). Refermces to hearing on Habeas Corpus will
be designated by: (Tr ......... )
Appellant was charged with robbery arising out of
of an incident which occurred on April 21, 1967. (Exh.
#2, Tr. 3). The Appellant was brought to trial on the
charge on .June G, 19li9, two yearn after the offense.

The Appellant retained private counsel to represent
him. Counsel for the Appellant filed a claim of alibi on
April 29, 19G9. (Exh. #2, Tr. 10). During the course of
the trial, Defense connsel called four witnesses, in addition to the Appellant to establish the claim of alibi (Exh.
#2 131-244). Defense counsel submitted on requested
instruction. (Exh. # Tr. 7). These instructions made
no reference on the claim of alibi The trial Court failed
to submit an instruction on the defense of alibi. (Exh.
#2, Tr. 5).
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. Defense
counsel filed a motion for a new trial. The hearing on
the motion and sentencing was continued from time to
time, with Appellant present, and was heard on June 27,
1969. On said date, the following colloquial took vlace:
(Exh. 2 not numbered)
THE COURT: This is the morning set for
the imposition of sentence in the case of State of
Utah vs. Andreason. Does the State have anything further you want to
MR. STRATFORD: I have nothing to say.
THE COURT: Does the defense have anything
say¥
MR. MASON: Nothing, other than what I expressed in chambers.
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THE COURT: I sentence you to serve a term in
the Utah State Prison for a term which shall be
for not less than five years and which may be for

life.

Take him to custody.
The court will be in recess until called.
Further, the minute entry, dated June 27, 1969 reflects the following language: (Exh. #2 not numbered)
"In closed chambers, defense counsel informed
the Court that he had no further evidence to present in support of his motion for new trial, Court
resUilles session."
At the hearing on the Habeas Corpus, the Appellant
testified that he did not go into the Court's chamber on
June 27, 1969. (Tr. 40). Further, he testified that his
counsel, the prosecuting attorney, went into the Court's
chambers and remained for approximately one hour.
(Tr. 40), returned to open session, whereupon the Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison.
Other facts will be brought out below.

POINT I
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR
TRIAL IN THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO
INSTRUCT ON THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI WHERE
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE SAME.

The Appellant, during the course of the trial for
robbery, called some four witnesses, in support of his defense of alibi pursuant to the notice of alibi duly and
timely filed. In the face of this evidence, the trial Court
failed to submit on instruction on alibi. The failure constitutes a denial of fair trial in that the Defendant was
placed subject to the Jury's discretion, without legal
guidence as to the law.
The lower Court in the instance case, found that the
trial Court's failure to instruct the jury on the issue of
alibi was simple error. (Tr. 14). Moreover, the lower
Court found that evidence on this issue of alibi was submitted at the time of trial. (Tr. 14). However, the lower
Court concluded that the error was not of such magnitude as to constitute reversible error. In St.ate vs. Whitely 100 U. 14, 110 P. 337 (1941), the Defendant was tried,
without jury, on the charge of burglary. The Defendant
introduced alibi evidence. The trial Court stated what
he believed the burden of proof in establishing alibi by
stating that the burden is on the defendant to establish
alibi. The Conrt reversed, stating in substance, that trial
Court erred in tliat the State must, in all cases, where the

presence of the accused is necessary to render him responsible, must prove that he was there as part of it's
case; and if from all of the evidence there exists a
reasonable doubt of his presence he should be acquitted.
The Court further stated:
"The burden of proving guilt must always
rest on the prosecutor." p. 339
"To charge that a Defendant has the burden
of establishing an alibi is plainly erroneous, for
the burden of proving guilt never shifts from the
government." (Cases cited, p. 339)
The Court concluded:
"In the instant case, the statements made by
the Court were matters of law upon which, if
given to a jury, the Court would base its reversal
and order a new trial, as such instructions would
have been erroneous." p. 340
The Appellant respects submits that if an erroneous
instruction is deemed reversible error, then clearly, no
instruction at all would constitute greater reversible
error. Further, the Appellant is aware that he is Habeas
Corpus not intended as a means for appellant review, but,
rather, Habeas Corpus is to be used to protect one who
is restrained of his liberty where there exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where the requirements of law have
been so ignored or distorted that a party is substantially
and effectively denied due process of law, or where some
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other circumstance exists that it would be wholly unconceivable not to review the conviction. Bryant vs. Turner
19 U. 284, 431P.2d121. (1967).
In determining the gravity of the error committed
at the time of trial, the facts elicited during the course of
trial must be examined in light of mandate set forth in
Bryant vs. Turner, supra.
The robbery occurred at 5 :00 p.m. on April 21, 1967.
The victim had a description of the suspect as, "individual wearing a black cap, dark jacket, about all he could
tell him, probably blonde. (Exh. #2, Tr. 38). Again, the
first description was given as "five feet eight, five feet
nine, perhaps 175 to 185 pounds. (Exh. #2, Tr. 53).
The initial offense report describes the suspect as: "Fair
complected, 5' 8" tall, about 170 lbs. Believed to be a
blonde wearing a dark baseball hat and a light colored
jacket." (State Exh. B, State vs. Andreason.) Approximately 10 months after the robbery, on Janurary 18,
1968, the victim was shown mug shots and identified the
Defendant.
The prosecutor's case also included testimony by
Lee Steward, wherein Mr. Stuart had told the Appellant
that the victim had lot of money from mining prospects.
(Exh. #2, Tr. 88). Further, on April 22, 1967, the Ap-
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pellant gave him two-one hundred dollar bills, (Exh. #'2,
Tr. 89), the later testimony circumstantially corroborated the victim's tl'stirnony that tweny-one, one hundred
dollar bills were taken from him. ( Exh. #2 Tr. 2G).
The case for the defrns(' counsel centered principally
around the character witness and alibi witnesses to support the testimony of the Appellant. His testimony was,
in suhstanc(·, that he returned home from a truck trip at
his parent's home at 10 :00 p.m. (Exh. #2 Tr. 202). On
April 21, he, with his brothers, drove the trucks to Harris
Trucking Equipment in 'I1remonton, Utah (Exh. #2, Tr.
203). He was picked np hy Golden Andreason, his father
and then proceeded to \Vest Hills Alfalfa Mills, Mendon,
Utah. ( Exh. #2, Tr. 205). They remained for 45 minutes
and proceeded to Tri-Miller Parking in Hyrum, Utah
and while they were there, they l)roceed<'d to Hanson
Motors' Logan, Utah and talked ·with Verl Hess, Exh. #2
Tr. 208) Next, they proceeded to Smithfield, then to
Millsvile to sec a brother, then back home in Elwood,
(Exh. #32, Tr. 210, 211) arriving at 5 :00 p.m. Thereafter, the Appellant went to Brigham City and visited
with his brothers until nine p.m. and went on a elate.
( Exh. #2, Tr. 212).
The Appellant's father, mother, and brothers largely
corroborated the A p1wllant 's testimony as to his whereabouts. -Worthy of notP is the kstimony of Fern Andreason, motlwr of the Avpellant. She kqit a diary. (Ii;xh.
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#2 Tr. 142). Reading her note on April 21, 1967, she
testified that "I have dad and the boys went to Logan
to order beef cut up and there they went to Curtis' at
night." (Exh. #2 Tr.145).
The evidence submitted by defense readily warrants
an instruction on the defense of alibi, without the instruction, the jury is left to it's imagination and speculation
as to how to construe the evidence. The same would be
true of the defense of insanity or self-defense. There is
no question as to the general proposition that where
there has been competent evidence in support of the Defendant's theory of the case, the Court must instruct the
jury in the same. This requirement is essential to a fair
trial. This requirement was ignored by the trial court
thereby depriving the appellant of a fair trial.
POINT II
THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE THE FAILURE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL TO
REQUEST AN INSTRUCTION AMOUNTED TO INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL THEREBY DENYING THE
APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL.

Defense counsel was a privately retained attorney
selected by the Appellant to represent him in the trial of
the robbery charge. Defense counsel passed away on
February 11, 1970. (Tr. 34).
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Defense counsel duly filed a Notice of Alibi on April
29, 1971. Pursuant to said Notice, he introdnced testimony Pstahlishing thL' Defondant's whereabouts at the
time of the alledged roblwry. He did submit one requested instruction, hut the record indicates that he
failed to ret111est an iustrnction on alibi - the one crucial
defense theory of his case.
In support of the Appellants position, the Court's
attention is drawn to the following case:
(1) Banks vs. U.S. 249 F. 2d G72 (1957). A government agent had allegedly urged the Defendant to purchase narcotics supposedly to aid a suffering friend of
the agent. The agent gave the Defendant the money and
Defendant made the purchase. The Defendant was advised by his attorney that he could admit the purchase to
the jury because of the entrapment defense·. Defense
counsel, however, failed to request an instruction covering entrapment and none was given by the Court. The
Court held that failure to request or give instructions on
the defense of entrapment is grounds for vacating the
sentence.

(2) POE VS. U.S., 233 F. Supp. 173 (1964) The
Defendant was on trial for sex crimes. His defense was
his own sworn denial. The government was in possession
of several 8tatenwnts al1egedly made by Poe, but the
trial Court nlled that they were inadmissible. Defense
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counsel requested an advisory ruling from the trial
Court to the admissibility of Defendant's statements for
impeachment evidence. Trial Court refused to give an
advisory opinion. Defense counsel was afraid that by
putting the Defendant on the stand, he would open the
door for impeachement evidence; therefore, he advised
the Defendant not to take the stand and he was
convicted. 'The District Court held that unawareness
on the part of the counsel of basic rule of law deprived
the Defendant of his only defense and of effective
counsel. The case was affirmed on appeal (352. F.2d 639)
on the very limited basis of affirming the trial court's
finding of a deprivation of a fair trial, by the Court,
counsel, or both.
Concedely, the above cases are not strictly in point
with issues herein presented. However, the Appellant
urges the Court to consider the facts and circumstances
which gave rise to the conviction of the Appellant in light
of the Sixth Amendment requirement of the right to
counsel. It cannot mean token representation. It must
carry with it the right to an effective and adequate representation by bringing to bear all facts and law to support the Defendant's cause. In the instance case, Defense counsel failed.
POINT III
THE APPELLANT HAS BEEN DENIED DUE
PROCESS OF LAW IN THAT HE WAS NOT PER-
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SONALLY PRESENT AT ALL STAGES OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, TO WIT: THE HEARING ON THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

Reference is made to the statement of facts herein
where it shows that a hearing without the Defendant was
held by defense counsel, prosecutor and the Court.
Utah Code Annotated (as amended 1953) 77-27-3
states:
"If the prosecution is for a felony, the Defendant must be personally present at trial ... "
This statute was interpreted by this Court in State
vs. Woo.l.sey, 19 U 486, 57p. 42() (1899) wherein it was

stated:
While there is some conflict of authority upon
the question, there is a great preponderance in
favor of the proposition that under such provisions the absence of the accused at the hearing
and decision of a motion for a new trial, at the
hearing and rendition of a judgment on appeal, at
the hearing on motion for a change of venue or
continuance of the case, at the hearing and decision on motion in arrest of judgment, or at the
hearing and decision of a demurrer to the indictment will not vitiate the judgment in a case of
felony, and that "it is not essential that the accused shonld be present at the filing and trial of
motions and pleas not involving the question of
guilt or innocence on the merits."

l

.,

·)

The Defendant's motion for a new trial raised issues
which ·would go to the (1uestion of guilt or innocence, i.e.,
that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence
and ne>vly discovered evidence. Even under the limited
ruling of the '\Y oolsey case, the Defendant was entitled
to be personally present when the Defense counsel present Pd his matters to the Court on his Motion for new
trial. Secret meeting without the Defendant present
should not be condoned.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant respectfully submits that the Habeas
Corpus should have been granted and not to do so constitutes reversible error.
Respectfully submitted,
Jimi Mitsunaga
Attorney for Appellant

